The FIFA Football Agent Regulations under scrutiny by the Court of Justice of the European Union: what lies ahead?

After more than two years of litigation, interim measures and intense debate among stakeholders across the football industry, on 16 July, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its long-awaited judgment in Case C-209/23, concerning the compatibility of the FIFA Football Agent Regulations (the 'FFAR') with EU law.

The case arose from a request for a preliminary ruling submitted by the Landgericht Mainz (Regional Court of Mainz, Germany) in proceedings initiated by two football agents against FIFA. The claimants sought a declaration that several provisions of the FFAR were inapplicable, contending that they infringed Articles 56, 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), as well as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).

In particular, the referring court questioned whether the exception developed by the CJEU in Wouters and Meca-Medina could extend to rules which, although not inherently sporting in nature, have an indirect impact on the operation of the transfer market and, consequently, on the composition of professional teams. The court also expressed doubts as to the legitimacy of the objectives pursued by FIFA, noting that they do not directly relate to the organisation and conduct of sporting competitions as such.

The proceedings form part of a broader wave of challenges brought by football agents and agents' associations across Europe against FIFA's new regulatory framework. Throughout the dispute, FIFA has consistently argued that the FFAR constitute a necessary, proportionate and legitimate mechanism to protect the integrity of the game and ensure the proper functioning of the international transfer system. However, in 2023, FIFA implemented a temporary worldwide suspension of certain FFAR provisions pending the CJEU's determination of the issues raised before the German court.

Key findings of the judgment

The FFAR falls within the scope of EU law

The CJEU first confirmed that the FFAR governs activities of an economic nature. The services provided by football agents are remunerated, frequently supplied on a cross-border basis, and have a direct impact both on the conditions under which agents operate and on competition within the football industry. Consequently, the FFAR cannot benefit from the so-called sporting exception, according to which certain rules adopted by sports governing bodies, where necessary for the proper functioning of sporting competitions, may prevail over EU law. According to the CJEU, this exception must be interpreted narrowly and applies only to rules adopted exclusively for non-economic purposes and relating to sporting competition as such. It therefore cannot be extended to the international transfer system as a whole.

1. Multiple representation

The provisions prohibiting the same agent - or connected football agents - from representing more than one party in the same transaction may indeed limit the level of competition in the market. However, the CJEU held that this fact alone is insufficient to categorise such rules as restrictions of competition 'by object' within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU.

The CJEU emphasised that these rules pursue the legitimate objective of preventing conflicts of interest and protecting agents’ clients. This is an ethical and professional-regulatory objective, distinct from purely competitive considerations, which the Court considers capable both of justifying the application of the Wouters exception under Article 101(1) TFEU and of legitimising a restriction on the freedom to provide services under Article 56 TFEU. The assessment entrusted to the national court therefore does not concern the legitimacy of the objective itself, which has already been recognised by the Court, but rather its practical implementation. Specifically, it must be determined whether the regulation genuinely pursues that objective, rather than merely economic interests, and whether the individual measures are appropriate and necessary to achieve it. It will thus be for the national court to verify whether less restrictive measures, such as transparency obligations or informed consent requirements for the parties involved, could adequately protect those interests.

2. Agents' fees: dynamic cap, the 'client pays' rule and the 'subsequent transfer' rule

With regard to the service fee cap established by Article 15(2) FFAR, the CJEU concluded that it does not amount to a restriction of competition by object. While acknowledging that price-setting arrangements may, in certain circumstances, raise competition concerns, the CJEU noted that the FFAR does not impose a fixed fee but rather introduces a proportional cap linked to the player's remuneration or the value of the transfer transaction. In principle, such a mechanism does not appear capable of eliminating competition between football agents or preventing them from receiving appropriate remuneration for their services.

The CJEU reached similar conclusions in relation to the provisions that:

• prohibit the payment of fees by third parties;
• establish the basis for calculating the agent's fees; and
• link agents' fee to players' remunerations.

According to the CJEU, these measures do not affect the market's primary competitive parameters, such as price and service quality, and therefore cannot be regarded as restrictions by object.

A different conclusion was reached regarding Article 14(12)(a) FFAR. This provision provides that an agent loses the right to receive any instalments of commission not yet due under an employment contract if the player transfers to another club before that contract expires - even where the agent no longer represents the player and has played no role in the subsequent transfer. The CJEU considered this consequence to be arbitrary, as it deprives the agent of remuneration earned for services already performed, despite the absence of any connection between the unpaid commission and the later transfer. For that reason, the CJEU classified the rule as a restriction of competition by object, finding it inherently liable to undermine the normal functioning of the market.

3. The FIFA licensing system

The CJEU found that the requirement to obtain and maintain a FIFA licence does not, in itself, amount to a restriction of competition by object. Likewise, provisions preventing individuals with certain criminal convictions or disciplinary sanctions from operating as agents do not appear anti-competitive, provided that they are applied on the basis of transparent, objective and non-discriminatory criteria.

4. Rules governing approaches to players represented by other agents

The CJEU adopted a more critical stance when assessing the rules restricting contact with players who are bound by an exclusive representation agreement with another agent until the final two months of that agreement.

The CJEU observed that this restriction does not apply to the incumbent agent, who remains free to negotiate a renewal of the existing mandate at any time. This asymmetrical treatment grants incumbent agents an unjustified competitive advantage and is liable to distort market competition. As a result, the CJEU classified these provisions as restrictions by object. It also rejected FIFA's argument that the rules were necessary to preserve contractual stability, holding that the regulatory framework pursues that objective in an inconsistent manner.

5. Transparency and disclosure obligations

With respect to the reporting and publication obligations contained in Articles 16 and 19 FFAR, the CJEU adopted a more nuanced approach.

The collection of information through FIFA's digital platform does not, in itself, constitute a restriction of competition, nor does the publication of certain transaction-related information automatically undermine competitive dynamics. However, the CJEU noted that the obligation to disclose details of all transactions - including the level of agents' fees - is drafted in particularly broad terms and may ultimately prove disproportionate to the objectives pursued by FIFA.

Article 102 TFEU: potential abuse of a dominant position

The CJEU confirmed that FIFA may be regarded as an undertaking for the purposes of Article 102 TFEU, given the extensive economic activities it carries out, including the organisation of competitions, the commercialisation of audiovisual rights and licensing activities.

The CJEU further recognised that FIFA holds a dominant position in markets where it exercises regulatory, supervisory and disciplinary powers. Where those powers are used in a manner capable of influencing the market for agents' services in favour of the economic interests of affiliated clubs or leagues, such conduct may amount to an abuse of a dominant position. 

Article 56 TFEU: freedom to provide services

The CJEU held that certain provisions of the FFAR are capable of restricting the freedom to provide services, including:

• the rules on multiple representation;
• certain licensing requirements; and
• the restrictions on contacts with players represented by other agents.

In relation to the latter, the CJEU observed that the objective of preserving contractual stability between agents and clients, as relied upon by FIFA, is essentially economic in nature and therefore cannot justify a restriction on the freedom to provide services guaranteed under Article 56 TFEU.

Article 6 of the GDPR: protection of personal data

The CJEU held that the following measures are incompatible with Article 6(1)(f) GDPR:

• the indiscriminate publication of all sanctions imposed on agents and clients, regardless of their seriousness and without any time limitation; and
• the detailed disclosure of all transactions carried out by agents, including the commissions received.

According to the CJEU, these obligations go beyond what is necessary to achieve the stated objectives, infringing the principles of data minimisation and proportionality.

Relationship with the Advocate General's Opinion

The CJEU's judgment is broadly consistent with the Opinion delivered by the Advocate General on 15 May 2025. Two aspects, however, deserve particular attention.

First, the CJEU expressly characterised the 'subsequent transfer rule' under Article 14(12)(a) FFAR as a restriction by object, developing a more in-depth analysis than that proposed by the Advocate General. The latter had assessed the rules on agents’ commissions, including Article 14 FFAR, as a single body of rules to be examined in terms of their effects, whereas the CJEU isolated Article 14(12)(a) as a 'distinct rule' and classified it as a restriction by object on the basis of the arbitrary deprivation of remuneration imposed on the agent.

Secondly, in its assessment of a potential abuse of a dominant position under Article 102 TFEU, the CJEU developed an autonomous analytical framework. In particular, the CJEU suggested that FIFA's conduct should be assessed against that of a reasonably efficient regulatory body capable of pursuing the same legitimate objectives through less restrictive means.

The aftermath of the judgment: key outstanding issues

The FFAR is not automatically invalid: the central role of the referring court

The CJEU’s judgment does not automatically invalidate the FFAR as a whole. This is due to the nature of the preliminary ruling procedure under Article 267 TFEU: the CJEU does not decide the national dispute itself but provides the referring court with the interpretation of EU law necessary to resolve it. In other words, the CJEU has established the legal principles and criteria that must guide the assessment of the challenged FFAR provisions, without making a final determination as to their validity in the specific case.

More specifically, the CJEU has set out a structured framework of analysis that the national court must apply to each of the contested provisions. The first step is to determine the nature of the restriction at issue. Where a rule amounts to a restriction of competition 'by object', meaning that it is inherently harmful to competition, it cannot benefit from any justification. Only measures that, although not intended to restrict competition, nonetheless produce restrictive effects may be subject to the subsequent stages of the assessment.

For those measures, the court must first determine whether they pursue a legitimate objective in the general interest rather than a purely economic objective. A purely economic aim is not sufficient, in itself, to justify a restriction of competition. However, a measure may still be justified where it genuinely seeks to protect a non-economic public interest, even if it also produces indirect economic effects.

Once the legitimacy of the objective has been established, the court must assess whether the measure is genuinely capable of achieving that objective, whether there are less restrictive but equally effective alternatives available, and whether the restrictive effects on competition are proportionate to the aim pursued. In other words, the rule must satisfy a strict test of necessity and proportionality.

It will therefore be for the Landgericht Mainz to apply this framework to each of the challenged FFAR provisions and determine whether the restrictions identified by the CJEU can be justified by legitimate public-interest objectives and whether they are, in practice, necessary and proportionate. While reserving this final assessment for the national court, the CJEU nevertheless provided a number of interpretative indications regarding the different categories of contested rules in order to guide the referring court in its analysis.

It should also be recalled that the application of several contested FFAR provisions remains suspended worldwide following FIFA's decision to await the outcome of the proceedings before the CJEU. 

Will the German court's decision become a reference point for other national courts?

A distinction must be made between the interpretation of EU law and its application in a specific case.

As regards interpretation, the CJEU's judgment is binding across the European Union. National courts dealing with similar disputes will therefore be required to apply the relevant provisions of the TFEU and the GDPR in accordance with the principles established by the CJEU.

The position is different, however, with respect to the forthcoming decision of the Landgericht Mainz. Unlike the CJEU's ruling, the German court's judgment will not be formally binding on courts in other Member States, as EU law does not recognise a system of horizontal precedent between national jurisdictions.

Nevertheless, the decision is likely to carry substantial persuasive authority. It will represent the first practical application of the principles articulated by the CJEU to the individual provisions of the FFAR and will therefore be closely scrutinised by courts, regulators and industry stakeholders across Europe.

At the same time, the possibility of divergent outcomes cannot be excluded. In the absence of further judicial guidance at EU level, courts in other Member States may reach different conclusions regarding the compatibility of specific FFAR provisions, particularly where different factual or evidential circumstances are advanced. It is precisely this risk of regulatory fragmentation that may encourage FIFA to revise the FFAR proactively, aligning the regulations more closely with the principles identified by the CJEU before inconsistent national approaches become entrenched.

FIFA's response to the judgment

FIFA welcomed the CJEU’s judgment, emphasising that it confirmed, in several respects, the compatibility of some of the key pillars of the regulatory framework introduced by the FFAR. In particular, the international governing body highlighted the validity of the licensing requirement, the dynamic service fee cap system, the "client pays" rule and other mechanisms aimed at regulating the football agent services market. According to FIFA’s interpretation, the judgment also confirms the legitimacy of FIFA’s regulatory role in the transfer system and recognises its ability to adopt measures designed to protect the integrity of the system and the proper functioning of the football market. However, this interpretation should be balanced against the fact that the CJEU did not grant FIFA unlimited regulatory powers. On the contrary, it made the compatibility of several measures subject to compliance with the principles of necessity, proportionality and consistency with the objectives pursued.

At the same time, FIFA announced its intention to engage with representatives of the agent community in the coming weeks in order to identify a consensual solution that takes into account the guidance provided by the CJEU. Its stated objective is to replicate the consensus-based governance model that has been developed in recent years with clubs, leagues and player representatives, using the judgment as a basis for reviewing the current regulatory framework. This review process is expected to form part of the broader reform of the international transfer system, which is scheduled to enter into force on 1 January 2027.

Against this background, the CJEU’s judgment does not appear to mark the end of the debate surrounding the FFAR, but rather the beginning of a new phase of interpretation and, likely, negotiation. On the one hand, FIFA can legitimately point to the fact that the CJEU did not, as a matter of principle, rule out the possibility of regulating the activities of football agents, nor did it declare the FFAR invalid as a whole. On the other hand, the judgment leaves several important issues unresolved, requiring the national court to carry out a case-by-case assessment of the compatibility of a number of provisions and taking a more critical stance towards certain specific rules.