The new FIFA regulations on the status and transfer of players: what changes in the 'post-Diarra' era for players and clubs?

On 10 June, FIFA published its revised Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (the 'RSTP' or 'Regulations'), which will enter into force on 1 January 2027. The updated rules redefine the global framework governing international players transfers and form part of a broader revision of professional football regulations in light of recent judicial cases.

Notably, the new Regulations consolidate FIFA's 'post-Diarra' reforms following the CJEU's judgment of 4 October 2024 (case C-650/22). In that pronouncement, the CJEU held that various provisions of the RSTP infringed the principles of free movement of workers under Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ('TFEU' or 'Treaty'), finding them disproportionally restrictive of players' international transfers. The Court also concluded that the RSTP restricted competition, in breach of Article 101 TFEU. In particular, the rules on compensation, joint liability of new clubs, sporting sanctions, and the automatic blocking of the player's International Transfer Certificate ('ITC') by the former association in case of a player's breach of the employment contract were found to be incompatible with the Treaty. 

Against this backdrop, the current amendments represent one of the most impactful overhauls of the RSTP to date. Crucially, FIFA will no longer be able to adopt regulations on the status and transfer of players unilaterally. Under the new Article 1, amendments to the RSTP (save for of Annex 1) require the consensus of representatives of employees (players), employers (clubs and leagues) and FIFA itself. Therefore, the new framework reflects a shift towards collaboration and greater balance of power in global football governance. 

The key changes to the RSTP are considered below. 

A completely redesigned 'protected period' system 

The 'protected period' refers to the initial phase of a professional player’s contract, which varies depending on the player’s age at the time of signing. During the protected period, enhanced contractual protection applies: a breach 'without just cause' within this timeframe triggers more severe economic and sporting consequences.

Under the current system, a two-tier model applies: for contracts concluded before a player's 28^th birthday, the protected period is three entire seasons or three years (whichever expires first); for contracts concluded thereafter, it is reduced to two seasons or two years. 

The new RSTP introduce a more age-tiered approach, based on the following criteria:

1. for contracts concluded before the player's 23rd birthday, the 'protected period' is four full seasons or years (whichever expires first);
2. between the ages of 23 and 28, it is three full seasons or years;
3. between the ages of 28 and 32, it is two full seasons or years; and
4. after the age of 32, it is reduced to one season or year. 

New Article 17: the core of the reform

The most relevant changes concern Article 17, which was heavily scrutinised in the Diarra judgment. 

A core objective of the RSTP is to ensure contractual stability. This is reflected in Article 13, which stipulates that contracts between players and clubs may only be terminated upon natural expiry or by mutual consent. Article 17 ('Consequences of terminating a contract without just cause') complements this principle by regulating the consequences of unilateral termination, thereby discouraging breaches and reinforcing contractual stability. This framework underpins the player transfer market, which effectively allows clubs to 'trade players' by agreeing, for financial consideration, to an early release from an existing employment contract. 

Under the revised framework, Article 17 has been renamed ('Consequences of breach of contract'), reflecting a broader scope. It now applies to any breach of contract, even where the agreement has not been formally terminated. The substantive amendments are outlined below. 

1. Liquidated damages clauses

The current RSTP contain no express regime for liquidated damages clauses, providing only that compensation should reflect the damage suffered, in line with the 'positive interest' principle and applicable national law. 

The revised RSTP now expressly stipulate that parties may agree in advance on the amount of compensation payable in case of a contractual breach, without requiring reciprocity. In other words, the revised Article 17 validates asymmetric compensation clauses, under which the financial consequences for breaches by clubs and players may legitimately differ. While the revised RSTP supports party autonomy, this is ultimately restricted by the discretion of the FIFA Football Tribunal, which is empowered to review their compensation agreements. That said, the Tribunal shall only reduce any agreed compensation with restraint, only if the quantum is excessively high, and it shall disregard the agreement only where it is manifestly unfair.  

A specific safeguard applies to lower-paid players. If a player earns an annual fixed remuneration of up to USD 150,000, any agreed compensation payable to that player must minimally equal the residual value of the breached contract. This applies unless exceptional circumstances justify a lower amount (although the RSTP do not specify what these circumstances might be). 

2. Compensation criteria 

Article 17 also lays down a compensation framework which applies absent any agreed compensation clauses. These guidelines distinguish between breaches by clubs and players.

Where the club is in breach, the player shall be entitled to full compensation for any damage resulting from such breach. Depending on the specific circumstances, such compensation shall take into account, in particular, the residual value of the breached contract, as well as 'any other damage caused'.

Conversely, where the player is in breach, the club shall be entitled to full compensation for any damage resulting from the breach. Depending on the circumstances of the case, this may include, in particular, the value of the player’s services, any lost transfer fee or transfer value, replacement costs, and any other unspecified damage suffered.

In all cases, compensation must be at least equal to the residual value of the contract, save in 'extraordinary circumstances', which are not further specified in the RSTP.

3. Abusive conduct

The revised rules introduce an additional mechanism to address abusive conduct. In such cases, the defaulting party may be liable to pay the non-defaulting party compensation of up to six months’ salary. This mechanism applies to both players and clubs and reflects the broader regulatory objective of discouraging harmful behaviour without necessarily triggering the immediate termination of the contract.

In practice, abusive conduct has most commonly arisen where clubs seek to exert pressure on players who refuse to extend their contracts and intend to leave as free agents upon expiry. In such situations, clubs have at times excluded the relevant player from training sessions and competitive matches. While in certain leagues players benefit from protection under collectively negotiated agreements, in many others the matter is left to individual contractual arrangements, where players typically have limited bargaining power or may not fully consider these risks at the negotiation stage.

That said, abusive conduct may also be attributable to players, e.g. to obtain from the club a release or transfer. 

4. Mitigation and prevalence of collective agreements 

The revised RSTP expressly impose a duty on the injured party to mitigate damage, whereas this was previously only implicit.

It also recognises that properly negotiated domestic collective agreements may depart from FIFA rules on the calculation of compensation, reflecting the growing importance of collective bargaining.

5. Joint liability of the new club 

The Diarra ruling heavily scrutinised the provisions on joint liability of new clubs and identified this matter as part of a set of rules that effectively dissuade clubs from signing players who have unlawfully and prematurely terminated an employment contract. 

Under the present Regulations, a player's new club may be jointly liable to pay compensation if it can be established that it induced the player to breach their contract. 

The revised RSTP clarify this point by providing that joint and several liability arises where inducement is established on the balance of probabilities. In addition, a rebuttable presumption of inducement applies where a player signs with a new club within 45 days of the breach.

6. Sporting Sanctions against clubs

Presently, a club's violation of a contract during the 'protected period' automatically bars it from signing players for two consecutive transfer windows. The new RSTP are more flexible and introduces a tiered sanctioning system. Within a two-year recidivism period, the following penalties apply: 

In aggravating circumstances, the sanctions for the third and fourth breaches may be imposed directly. In addition, where it is established that a new club has induced a breach during the 'protected period', a two-window ban shall be directly imposed. 

The transition from automatic sanctions to a tiered system is, in principle, a positive development, as it allows for greater flexibility and helps avoid overly rigid or disproportionate outcomes. However, the revised approach is not without its shortcomings.

First, clubs with substantial financial resources may regard the lighter sanctions for initial breaches as imposing negligible consequences, which potentially reduces their deterrent effect. In this regard, it is notable that Article 17 does not prescribe any minimum or maximum amount for the fines that may be imposed. In the absence of defined parameters, there is no guarantee that fines will be calibrated at a level sufficient to deter financially powerful clubs from treating a breach of contract as an acceptable commercial risk.

Moreover, the limitation of five registrations under the second sanctioning tier may prove insufficiently restrictive in certain contexts, particularly for clubs with large squads or during specific transfer windows.

Further, the two-year recidivism period is easily avoided: clubs could wait for the term to expire before committing a new violation.

7. Sporting sanctions on players 

The sporting consequences to players remain substantively unchanged. Under both current and new of Regulations, if a player breaches the contract during the 'protected period', he may be banned from partaking in official matches for a period between four to six months (the latter in aggravating circumstances). 

Revisions to RSTP provisions on contracts for minors

Under the current rules, players under the age of 18 may not sign professional contracts exceeding three years. The new RSTP exempt young players already permanently registered with the club from this stipulation. Specifically, where a player has been registered with the same club for at least 20 months or for two consecutive competition periods, contracts of up to five years may be concluded, subject to any restrictions under national law or collective agreements. 

However, this extension is complemented by a system of guarantees and limits which seek to rebalance the position of the young player: 

1. the club may sign no more than five new contracts per season with players under 18 for a term exceeding three years;
2. in the fourth year of the contract, players mandatorily receive a 10% increase in fixed remuneration (and up to 30% if they made at least 10 appearances in official matches with the first team in the previous season);
3. in the fifth year of the contract, a further minimum increase of 20% is envisaged under the same conditions; 
4. for the purposes of such increases, 'appearance' means participation in at least one full half of an official match. 

Altogether, the new rules aim to foster greater stability in club relations with young talents without sacrificing their interests in economic protection and career development. 

The release of the ITC and new configuration of validation exceptions 

In the FIFA international transfer system, validation exceptions are technical-procedural blocks in the Transfer Matching System that prevent a transfer from being completed without FIFA's intervention. 

Under the current regime, five situations trigger such exceptions. Four are objective (i.e. transfers of minors without authorisation; breaches of transfer bans; exceeding loan limits; or applications outside the transfer window).   

The fifth exception (which is the subject of reform) proved more problematic: it arose where the former association declined to issue an ITC and this refusal was challenged by the new association. In practice, this allowed the former club to use the non-issuance of an ITC as leverage in contractual disputes, preventing the player's registration with the new club. 

An initial post-Diarra amendment addressed this by requiring the former association to issue the ITC within 72 hours. The revised RSTP go further by removing this situation from the list of validation exceptions altogether and requiring the ITC to be issued within five days of the application. 

While the former association may still indicate that it reserves financial claims against the player and/or new club, the player’s registration can no longer be blocked. This clearly separates the administrative process of the transfer from the underlying contractual dispute, reduces the leverage previously available to clubs, and enhances player mobility.

Player participation in transfer fees

New Article 21bis introduces a framework for player participation in transfer fees. As a general rule, clubs and players remain free to agree on such participation. However, for permanent international transfers involving players earning less than EUR 150,000 per season, a mandatory regime applies.

In such cases, the releasing club must allocate 5% of the fixed transfer fee received to the player, subject to a limited waiver above a protected minimum threshold linked to the player’s salary or a portion of the transfer fee. Such a waiver may only apply to the portion of the 5% participation exceeding the higher of (i) the player’s fixed remuneration for the last year of contract with the releasing club or (ii) 2.5% of the total fixed transfer compensation. Any waiver that would result in a lower participation shall be disregarded to the extent that it exceeds these limits.

This entitlement may be excluded where prohibited by national law, domestic regulations, or valid collective agreements, or where equivalent mechanisms already exist.

Conclusion 

The revised RSTP represents more than a formal adjustment to the framework governing international transfers: it constitutes a substantial reconfiguration of professional football regulation, moving to a more collaborative and negotiated model that seeks to balance contractual stability with player protection. 

This recalibration is most evident in the revised Article 17. FIFA has moved beyond a regime primarily focused on unjustified unilateral termination towards a broader framework promoting mutual fairness. The new provision introduces more detailed rules on compensation, clarifies the circumstances in which new clubs incur liability, and replaces the previously rigid sanctioning model with a more graduated system capable of accommodating breaches of differing severity and a diverse range of circumstances. 

Moreover, the recognition of a player's economic interest in the value of their own transfer under Article 21bis is to be welcomed in principle. However, the provision applies only to the fixed component of the transfer fee, potentially creating structural incentives to inflate variable consideration, and may be disapplied where equivalent domestic mechanisms already exist.

Overall, the revised RSTP form part of a broader regulatory overhaul, complemented by the new Procedural Rules Governing the Football Tribunal and the revised FIFA Disciplinary Code, all of which enter into force in 2027. While the textual revisions represent positive developments, their enduring impact will largely depend on how the Football Tribunal applies them.

With contributions from Keshava Navale.