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Fire of truth

Case update

Various cases of interest are considered in the accompanying notes and here we provide an update on some other interesting cases. 

Executors in contempt of Court: Saleemi v Parvez [2025] EWHC 1341 (Ch); [2025] EWHC 1340 (Ch)

An executor was found to be in contempt of court because he had not paid over the surplus funds in the estate to the beneficiary, despite two court orders to do so.

Facts

Mr Parvez, the Defendant, was the executor of the estate of Mr Darlow.  Mr Saleemi, the Claimant, was the sole beneficiary.  Mr Parvez signed estate accounts in late 2022 and emailed them to Mr Saleemi's solicitors shortly thereafter.  Nothing further was heard from him, and he failed to pay any money due to the Claimant. 

Mr Saleemi brought proceedings for an account ie to force Mr Parvez to produce full estate accounts showing the administration of the estate funds, to explain what had happened to the estate funds or to pay the sums due to him.

The judge ordered Mr Parvez to provide an account within 21 days and to transfer the estate money (just over £130,000) to Mr Saleemi in 28 days.  The order was served on Mr Parvez personally and by email.  He did not comply with the order, and so the order was reissued with a penal notice (which is a warning attached to a court order stating if the person bound by the order does not comply, that they may be punished for contempt of court).

In January 2025, having still had no engagement nor compliance with the order, Mr Saleemi made a further application but was unable to serve Mr Parvez.  The Court gave the Mr Parvez a final chance by issuing a bench warrant (a court-issued arrest warrant which allows the policy to arrest someone and bring them before the court) requiring him to attend a hearing.  The Tipstaff (a Court appointed official tasked with enforcing court orders) was unable to find Mr Parvez at his address and those present at the property reported he had not lived there for several years. The Court found that Mr Parvez was evading service. 

Decision

Contempt is assessed on a criminal standard (ie beyond reasonable doubt).  The Court found Mr Parvez was clearly in contempt of Court – he had been personally served with proceedings with a penal notice and had taken no steps to engage.

The Court decided to sentence immediately rather than adjourning to allow Mr Parvez the chance to put forward any mitigating circumstances. It was held that Mr Parvez had refused to attend Court in the face of a bench warrant and it would be disproportionate to put Mr Saleemi to the costs of another hearing. 

Section 4 of the Debtors Act 1869 prevents a debtor being sent to prison for failing to pay up, but there is a carve out for trustees or fiduciaries who can be imprisoned for a maximum of 12 months.  Having found that the estate money was in Mr Parvez's possession and control, the Court ordered an immediate 12-month custodial sentence.  The Defendant was found to have 'wilfully disobeyed a court order with a penal notice. The contempt is aggravated by the fact that he is in a position of trust as an executor'.  

Why this matters for charities

The decision is a powerful enforcement precedent.  It shows the court will take a strict approach when encountering obstructive executors (who are 'in a position of trust').  The Courts will intervene decisively where funds are withheld or progress is stalled.

Legal recognition of informal caregiving arrangements: Rogers v Wills [2025] EWHC 1367 (Ch)

Many families discuss caring for an elderly parent at some stage.  Age UK research from 2023 found that more than three million people in the UK were personally caring for an elderly parent, with that number projected to more than double in the future.

This case considered informal caregiving arrangements and what, if any, legal recognition should be given to those arrangements.

Facts

Bernadette Rogers is the eldest of five siblings.  She cared for their mother, Sheila, for nearly two and a half years before Sheila died, including bringing Sheila to live with her.  Bernadette was her mother's joint attorney with Andrew, Sheila's oldest son and the Defendant in this matter.

Sheila is said to have insisted on numerous occasions that she 'did not want charity' and that Bernadette should be compensated for providing care.  There was evidence, in the form of text messages discussing how Sheila was to be cared for, that Bernadette's siblings agreed Bernadette should receive payment for the time she spent with Sheila. 

Bernadette had no agreement setting out the amount to be paid with Sheila, nor with her siblings.

Sheila's Will appointed Andrew as executor and split the estate equally between all five siblings.  Bernadette claimed that shortly before Sheila died she spoke to Andrew about the fact she had not been paid for caring for Sheila and Andrew said, 'just take it'. 

Not long after Sheila died, Bernadette, who had access to Sheila's bank accounts as her Attorney, transferred £100,000 from Sheila's bank accounts to her own as payment for the care she provided.  That pit Bernadette against her siblings, who as beneficiaries of Sheila's estate saw that payment as excessive (and clearly, it reduced their shares of the estate).

A successful action was brought by the fraud department of Sheila's bank to recover the sums Bernadette had transferred herself.  Criminal prosecution against Bernadette for the theft of £100,000 ensued (with the siblings being instrumental), but Bernadette was acquitted.

Bernadette started proceedings against Andrew (as executor) seeking £135,000, which was the sum Bernadette said she ought to have been paid for the care she provided to Sheila.  Bernadette claimed in contract on the basis that Sheila had agreed to reimburse her for expenses which she had incurred and that she would receive reasonable remuneration for giving that care.  Alternatively, Bernadette claimed in unjust enrichment on the basis that Sheila's estate had been unjustly enriched at her expense because of the care which she had supplied.

The court ordered that the case should be dealt with in two stages – the first dealing with the question of whether Bernadette was entitled to be paid, and the second dealing with how much she should be paid.

Decision

Bernadette succeeded in establishing that she had a contractual agreement with Sheila. Even if there had not been a contract (if for example Bernadette had not been able to show that Sheila intended to pay for the care), the court said Bernadette would still be entitled to be paid because Sheila knew Bernadette expected to be paid for providing care and accepted the care on that basis.  That meant Sheila's estate had been 'unjustly enriched' by the amount Shelia ought to have paid for her care.

How much Sheila is to be paid is yet to be decided.

Why this matters for charities

The case signals an emerging category of claims in the form of family care cost reimbursement.  Such claims directly reduce the residuary estate and therefore diminish charitable entitlement.  Charities may need to scrutinise such claims closely.

Resolving ambiguity in wills: British Camelids v Brooke & Others [2025] EWHC 2255 (Ch)

This case considered what happens when charity beneficiaries named in a will have ceased to exist when the testator dies.  

Facts

Candia Midworth, the testatrix, was an animal loving conservationist who kept llamas at her farm in Surrey.  

Ms Midworth passed away in April 2022.  Her 1994 will left her estate (the 'Estate') to 'such of the following [animal charities] that exist at the date of my death'.  These included the Brooke, Born Free Foundation, World Society for the Protection of Animals (now World Animal Protection) (the 'Charities'), Burstow Wildlife Sanctuary, British Camelids and Cruelty Free International.  

British Camelids and Cruelty Free International remain in the same 'form' as they were in 1994.

The Charities were unincorporated but they became incorporated in the early 2000s for logistical reasons (mainly for ease of administration and to mitigate the risk of trustees taking on personal liabilities).  The new, incorporated charities have different charity numbers to the previously unincorporated ones. 

Burstow Wildlife Sanctuary no longer exists.

British Camelids issued proceedings claiming that the 'original' Charities no longer existed because they had become incorporated.  British Camelids argued that the Charities' and Burstow Wildlife Sanctuary's shares in the Estate should therefore pass to British Camelids and Cruelty Free International (dividing the Estate two-ways rather than six-ways).

British Camelids also argued that the Charities were no longer carrying out their charitable purposes (eg by claiming that Born Free was no longer carrying out its original Zoo Check campaign (despite Born Free producing evidence of current campaigns monitoring animal treatment in zoos) and that World Animal Protection was no longer carrying out the Libearty Campaign (despite World Animal Protection providing the Court with a link to the Libearty Campaign – now world Withers famous!)).

Decision

The court found in favour of Brooke, Born Free and World Animal Protection.  It held that continuity of charitable purpose was determinative.  Even though the charity numbers referenced in Ms Midworth's will were no longer in use, the Charities carry out the same charitable purposes as their unincorporated predecessors did and their entitlement was not extinguished. 

This applies save if the gift is conditional on the continued existence of the specific named institution.  Ms Midworth had not required the charities to exist specifically under the charity numbers in her will, even though it was open to her to do so.

The Court also considered the question of how the Burstow Wildlife Sanctuary's share of the Estate should be applied. As the Burstow really does no longer exist, its share of the estate survives for its charitable purposes of 'the rescue, care and rehabilitation of wildlife and domestic animals, where possible returning wildlife to its natural habitat or finding homes for wild and domestic animals'.  The Court accepted the Brooke, Born Free and World Animal Protection's argument that those three charities are best-placed to carry out those purposes.

Why this matters for charities

This case provides reassurance that incorporation or restructuring of a charity will not cause charities to necessarily lose legacies, provided the charitable purpose continues. It protects charities that became incorporated at a later date from claims seeking to divert residue elsewhere.

Private wills: Michael Johnson v His Majesty’s Attorney-General [2025] EWHC 1943 (Ch)

This case was the first judgment to consider and grant an application to seal the will of someone outside the Royal Family, in this case, for an individual alleged to have been a leading member of the Provisional IRA.

Facts

The High Court considered an unusual application to seal the will of the late Frank Cowley, formerly known as Freddie Scappaticci.  Mr Cowley was long alleged in the media to have been 'Stakeknife', the British Government’s most significant agent inside the Provisional IRA. 

Mr Cowley died in March 2023, having been the subject of intense public scrutiny for two decades.  His alleged dual role in the IRA’s internal security unit and as a government agent had generated sustained and often hostile media attention, death threats, and significant security risks.

Following press allegations in 2003, Mr Cowley moved to England, changed his name, and lived under continued risk of violent reprisals. The Northern Ireland High Court granted an injunction in 2006 prohibiting the publication of information that could identify him or his whereabouts.  Even after his death, the publication of the Operation Kenova interim report in 2024, which assessed evidence of alleged serious criminality connected to the individual codenamed Stakeknife, reignited media interest.

At his death, Mr Cowley's executors renounced probate, and the applicant (Michael Johnson) agreed to act as personal representative only if the will was sealed.  Mr Johnson cited serious concerns for his own safety and the safety of beneficiaries.  The Attorney‑General appeared as respondent to represent the public interest but supported the application.

Decision

The Court granted an order sealing the will for 70 years, restricting access to the court file, and allowing probate and tax administration without attaching or disclosing the will.

The Court held that disclosing the will would be 'undesirable and inappropriate' under Rule 58 of the Non‑Contentious Probate Rules 1987, given the real risk of serious physical harm to the personal representative and to beneficiaries if their identities were revealed.

Importantly, the Court emphasised that the will itself was routine and revealed nothing of public interest.  The usual reasons for public access such as preventing fraud, tracing beneficiaries and notifying creditors carried little weight in this context.

Articles 2, 3 and 8 ECHR (life, protection from inhuman treatment, privacy) supported the sealing order.

Why this matters for charities

Charities rely on Smee & Ford having access to every Will propounded and estate values in order to know the likely value of residuary bequests. Although centred on extraordinary facts, this case is significant in that it puts that access at risk. 

Without that service charities have less opportunity to connect with executors who don't realise the importance of engaging with charity beneficiaries.  Knowing the value is an important element in deciding how to engage if difficulties arise. The issue in this case was not value but identities, and the circumstances will hopefully make it very much an outlier, rather than a precedent for more cases. 


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Isabelle Moisy

Isabelle Moisy

Associate | London

Isabelle Moisy

Associate | London

Trust, estate and inheritance disputes

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